Second Distinction. Second Part. About the Unity of Baptism

25. About the second main matter [n.9] I ask three questions: first, whether unity of baptism necessarily requires that it be conferred by one minister; second whether it requires that the washing and the speaking of the words be simultaneous; third whether, because ‘one’ is what is undivided in itself and divided from what is other [Ord. I d.11 n.40], it requires him who baptizes to be distinct in person from him who is baptized.

Question One. Whether the Unity of Baptism Necessarily Requires that it be Conferred by one Minister

26. To the first question argument is made that it is not so required.

Because the same person can baptize several people at the same time;     therefore , several people can baptize the same person. The consequence is plain from the likeness. The proof of the antecedent is, first, that it is possible to pour water on two people at the same time, saying “I baptize you (plural) etc     .;” nor does it seem that anything is lacking there to prevent both being baptized; second, because if the baptizer were monstrous having two heads, he could baptize at the same time and yet it is probable that there are there two persons, because two principal parts; and third by likeness, because the same priest can at the same time consecrate several hosts.

27. When for some effect several things run together, those things can be made equally from one and from many (this is plain about a house: one stone can equally be positioned by one person and another by another and at length the house will be completed just as it would be if all the stones, up to the introducing of the form [of the house], were put in place by the same person; it is plain also in another example, where there is greater unity of effect, for a ship can equally be dragged in one pull by several people as by one person who has with them an equal virtue). But in baptism many things come together, as washing and speaking of words; therefore baptism can be conferred equally by two, one of whom washes and the other speaks the words, as by the same person washing and speaking.

28. To the contrary:

The minister there represents Christ, who is mediator of God and man, and Christ is one [I Timothy 2.5].

I. To the Question

29. I reply: ‘many baptizing’ can be understood either as baptizing ‘the same recipient’ or baptizing ‘many recipients’.

30. And each of these can further be sub-distinguished:

Because if they baptize ‘the same recipient’, either each does the whole or one washes and the other speaks the words.a

a.a [Interpolation] or each does part and neither does the whole, as that one washes and the other speaks the words.

31. The second division is also sub-distinguished, because if one baptizes ‘many’, either many who are clearly distinct or many who are unclearly distinct (as in a monstrous birth, where there is doubt if it is one person or two).We today would likely speak of ‘conjoined twins’ here. ³³

32. About these four divisions in turn:

A. About Baptism Administered by Two Ministers who Together do the Whole

33. About the first [n.30] I say that that person is baptized, because it is not likely that one doer would annul the deed of the other; but if only one of them were to do what both do, it would be done; therefore, no less is it done when the other does the like.

34. About this there are two doubts:

The first is that the same thing cannot be from two total causes; but when one washes and speaks the words he is the total cause in baptizing, and does it with the causality that belongs to a minister; therefore, the same baptism cannot be from someone else who is a causer in the same place in the same order. The major is proved through this proposition, that nothing is a cause when, on its non-existence, the effect none the less exists [cf. Ord. I d.3 n.522].

35. Again, if the agent and the form by which he acts are different things, the form induced is different (this is taken from the Commentator [Averroes] on Physics 5, comm.2 48-49); but here there is this agent and that agent (in the way being an agent belongs to a minister), and a different form by which each acts, because there is one intention in this agent and another in that; therefore the act of baptizing is simply different. But to each action belongs its own action undergone; so there are several undergoings of baptism there, and consequently several baptisms.

36. As to the first [n.34] I concede the major about the cause that does effectively induce the form.

37. And if it is objected that at least the form of baptism, as it is a sacrament, is induced by the minister, and thus there are two causes and each is total - I respond: if each washes, neither is total cause in washing, and this whether the washing is done by immersion - (for then both move the body of the one immersed by one motion that is caused by the motive power of both; and although another could cause the motion, nevertheless when they move together neither uses his whole motive power to the extent he could use it - it is plain when two carry one weight which either could carry) - or whether it be done by pouring or sprinkling; albeit each make [the recipient] wet with the per se poured water, yet neither makes him wet with the whole wetting that comes from the sprinkling done by both.

38. But a difficulty still seems to stand, because each is total cause with respect to the speaking of the words; therefore, as to one part of the exterior effect (which is the sacrament) there will be two total causes, and this is as impossible about a part of the effect as about the whole of it.

39. I reply: it is difficult for the words of one of them not to be superfluous in this way, that they are not per se part of one sacrament; because it is to set down two things of the same idea as parts of one thing that is simply perfect in having one of them; the other seems to be superfluous.

40. But which words are superfluous, and whose as speaker, is difficult to assign, because the reason by which it is this one is a reason by which it is that one - and so each or neither is superfluous, because each speaks the words equally completely and with like intention.

Look for the response.b

b.b [Interpolation] It can be said that the act of baptizing by this one or that other one is valid, namely his whose act of baptizing God accepts. But whose he accepts determinately is altogether uncertain to us; only God knows, and he to whom he wishes to reveal it.

41. To the second argument, about action [n.35], there is doubt whether it be placed in the undergoer or the doer. And if in the undergoer, the action is not a ‘many’ in reality if the undergoings are not many; nor are the undergoings many when the form received in the undergoer is one; and, by holding this view, the major proposition that is taken from the Commentator [n.35] must be denied. But if action be placed in the agent, whether action is something absolute or a relation to the undergoer, then the major can be conceded; but then the proposition that ‘to diverse actions respond diverse undergoings’ [n.35] is false. In whichever way, then, that action is spoken about, several baptizings are not posited but one is.

42. And from this seems to follow a corollary, that the sacrament of baptism is more the baptism undergone than the baptism done, because baptism is not multiplied when the doing of baptism is multiplied, for the undergoing of baptism is one. This inference also seems probable, because the one baptized properly receives the sacrament; for he properly receives the washing undergone, and not the washing done, unless the washings be said to be the same really.

B. About Baptism Administered by Two Ministers who do Something Separately

43. About the second member of the distinction [n.30], I say that when each does something separately, and neither does the whole in thus washing and speaking at the same time, nothing is done.

44. Nor is there a reason save the institution of God who, as he wished there to be one principal agent, so he wished to have one minister in the integral conferring of the sacrament.

45. This is also plain by taking up the form that we use for, from our words, he who speaks them signifies that he is washing; and his speaking, which is the form of our sacraments, should not be false. The like must also be understood of the words of the Greeks, who say ‘let him be baptized etc.’, because this is not merely an invocation but as it were a certain efficacious willing, so that the sense is, ‘Through this my act over him, let him be baptized’.

C. About the Baptizing of Many Carried out by One Minister all at Once

46. About the third member of the distinction [n.31], it is conceded that when someone sprinkles or pours [water] on several at once and at the same time prounounces the form in the plural saying “I baptize you [plural]”, he does baptize them all at once but sins mortally, because he does not keep the form imposed on him by the Church - and this unless perhaps there were so great a necessity that the death of all were imminent at once, and that if he were to baptize individuals singly some one of them would be dead before he had baptized the others.

47. But here there is a doubt whether there be then one baptism.

It seems that there is not because several are baptized and consequently there are several undergoings of baptism, and thus several baptisms.

48. But the opposite also seems to be the case, because there is only a single form, for the same words are spoken once.

49. It could be more conceded perhaps that there are several baptisms, by holding to what was stated, that the sacrament of baptism is the undergoing of baptism [n.42].

50. And then in response to the argument [n.48]: either there is no need, for the pluralizing of something, that all things in it are pluralized, but it is enough that some of them are pluralized for the whole to be pluralized; or the form is not simply one , because the plural ‘you’ includes in itself the singular ‘you’ several times doubled.Priscian, Institutiones Grammaticae V ch.9, “It is well said that the singular too, when doubled and multiplied, makes all numbers, and that all numbers are composed of it and dissolve into it.” ³⁴

51. But would the case of necessity that is posited about several who are going to die at once [n.46] excuse from mortal sin a minister who uses the form ‘I baptize you [plural]’? It seems this is reasonable, because from the fact it was in the power of the Church to determine, as to some of the words, the form, ‘I baptize you [singular]’ (as was said above, d.3 nn.48-76), it does not seem that the Church wanted to restrict anyone so precisely to this form that the way of salvation would thereby be closed off to anyone. But now salvation would be closed off for some one of those in a case of necessity if one could not, without mortal sin, use the form ‘I baptize you [plural]’, for if it were in any case a sin, no one ought thus to baptize them; for no one should procure the salvation of another by sinning in himself mortally.

D. About the Baptism of a Receiver whose Unicity is in Doubt

52. About the fourth member of the distinction [n.31] I say that if time can be had for discerning whether the monstrous birth is simply one person or two, diligent investigation should first be made about this before it is baptized. And investigation can be made either from the parts of the body (for example if there be two heads or two spines in the back), or there is the more principal indication of hearts.

53. But this [indication of hearts] cannot easily be clear while it is alive.

54. But neither can the sign about two heads be altogether certain, because it would be possible for some chamber of the womb to be divided through the whole of it, besides at the top, and then the parts of the seed, falling through the womb’s diverse openings, would come together in the whole lower part and be distinct in the top part; and two heads would be formed there although, however, the rest of the matter would only be sufficient for the formation of one person.Scotus seems to be following an example discussed more fully by Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet VI q. 14. ³⁵

55. Briefly, the clearest sign for discrimination is through act of intellect and will: for, if there are two souls, it is not necessary that one know whatever the other knows, nor that one wants what the other wants; yet rarely or never does it happen that there are two souls without two heads or two principal parts of the head, though not conversely.

56. And if in any way a diversity of intellects in understanding can be detected (for example, that by some sign it were detected that the same thing was known and not known), or if a diversity of wills could be detected (for example, that there was a willing there and a refusing of the same thing), without doubt should one hold that there were two souls there.

57. But this can only be judged about an adult monstrous birth, of the sort posited to have existed in France, possessing two heads, one of which expressed a refusal of that for which the other expressed a willingness; for one wanted to be continent and live soberly and the other to be lascivious and to feast; and when one would go to extremes in eating through its mouth, the other would exclaim it was bloated.The story is in Henry of Ghent, ibid. ³⁶

58. About this monstrous case I say that if certitude can be had, and if there are parts about which it is plain that they belong to distinct persons, each part should have water poured on it separately, with repetition of the form [of baptism] in the singular on each of them. If certitude cannot be had, it is to be baptized, at least on those parts that belong principally to one of them, with the form in the singular; and second those parts are to be washed that do not seem principally to belong to that first one, and this with the form to be observed in those cases where there is doubt, which is set down in Decretals III tit.42 ch.2, Gregory IX [“Where there is doubt if they have been baptized, let them be baptized with these words, ‘If you are baptized I do not baptize you; but if you are not yet baptized, I baptize you etc.’”].

II. To the Initial Arguments

59. As to the first argument [n.26]: the antecedent is not true when speaking of one baptism, for if the same person baptizes several people, this is by several undergoings of baptism, and so there are several baptisms. And if the intention is to prove the major by speaking of one baptism, I say that the first proof, about many who are sprinkled at once, does not prove this (as is plain in the third member of the distinction [nn.47-49]); nor does the second proof about monstrous births, for if there were two persons in such a monstrous birth, they would have to be baptized individually; and if they were baptized together under this form ‘I baptize you (plural)’, then although the minister would sin without necessity (because a case could not easily be found of a sort that their baptism one by one could not be waited for), yet they would be two baptisms (as was said in the third member of the distinction [nn.47-49]). As to the third proof, about the eucharist, I say that although the priest, by speaking the words once, may consecrate several hosts at once, yet there are several instances of being consecrated there; and it could also be conceded that they would be several hosts or eucharists; similarly, just as there would be several hosts, there would be several consecrated wines.

60. To the second [n.27] I say that in some case several things run together each of which without the other is something in itself (and just as it is something in itself, thus can it remain so as to be something of the whole - just as in that example about the parts of the house). It is not this way in the issue at hand, because neither are the words without the washing anything of the baptism, nor is the washing without the words.

61. And if you say that at least as existing together they [the washing and the words] are something of baptism, and in this way can they yet be from several diverse ministers - this is true if the unity of the efficient cause were not requisite insofar as they constitute a single sign; but unity is requisite because of the ordaining by its principal agent [=God] (not also by its provider [=the Church]) that it is an efficacious sign when it is administered totally by the same minister.

Question Two. Whether the Unity of Baptism Requires the Washing and the Speaking of the Words to be Simultaneous

62. To the second proceeding thus:

It seems that the washing and the speaking of the words do not need to be simultaneous, because the Eucharist is one sacrament and yet between the words of consecration over the bread and the words of consecration over the wine there is a long interval, from the place ‘In like manner’ up to here ‘This is the cup’.

63. To the contrary:

Augustine On John’s Gospel tr.80 n.3 [Gratian, Decretum p.2 cause 1 q.1 ch.54], “The word reaches the element and it becomes the sacrament.”

I. To the Question

64. As to this question, it is plain that simultaneity is required, and the principal reason is the institution of Christ, who institutes these two as one complete sign for signifying the effect, such that neither would be a sign without the other. But what sort of simultaneity?

A. The Opinion of the Glossator

65. One opinion touches on the chapter Detrahe“Others say that the water begins and ceases to be the sacrament in the same instant, namely in the final moment of speaking the form, ‘I baptize you’.” “‘Take away [detrahe] the word from the water’, that is, take away the form, and it will not be the sacrament of baptism. And note that Gandulphus Bononiensis said that the water itself is the sacrament, namely the element itself..; hence if an ass drink the water it drinks the sacrament. Others say it is impossible that an ass drink the sacrament.” ³⁷ [Gratian, Decretum, p.2 cause 1 a.1 ch.54], that “the water per se is not the sacrament but when it is conjoined with the word, namely in the last moment of speaking the form.”

66. “And this is true,” says the Glossator, “according to them, to the extent that if in the instant in which the form is ended, and the water becomes the sacrament, the boy were not in the water, namely because before [the minister] said ‘and of the Holy Spirit’ he had raised him from the water, the boy would not be baptized.”

67. Nor yet does it follow that an ass could drink the sacrament, because the gloss touches there on the argument against Gandulphus, who says that the water alone is the sacrament; but for this reason does this not follow against them, because they say the water is the sacrament only in that ultimate instant [n.65].

68. “Nor is it strange,” according to the glossator, “if it begin and cease to be in the same instanta, since it is possible to find this in other cases according to the law.”

a.a [Interpolated text] And if you say that then too an ass, on drinking the water, would drink the sacrament in that ultimate instant [n.67] - I reply that, according to him, it simultaneously begins and ceases to be in the same instant.

69. And he sets down a case from the Digest [Corpus Iuris Civilis] XLVI ch.4 n.21], and he criticizes the example.“For if something is owed to me under a condition and I receive what is owed, I have taken it before the existence of the condition; if the condition exist afterwards, it begins and ceases to be owed in the same instant.” The glossator criticizes the case because what the law says is false: the debtor was freed long ago, and the debt was not later owed even for an instant. ³⁸

70. But he sets down another, “in the case of a slave given by a man to his wife so that he may free him, for in the same instant he begins and ceases to have lordship,”The Latin here, because of its vagueness, could also be translated to mean “in the case of a slave given by a man to his wife so that she free him, for she begins and ceases to have lordship in the same instant.” But Scotus does not take it this way in his response later [n.76]. ³⁹ Digest, XXIV ch.1 n.7 sect.9.

71. Another example can be set down, when someone begins and ceases to be a debtor, Digest XVI ch.1 n.24.

B. Rejection of the Opinion

72. The above [nn.66-71] can well be ‘Bernardican’ objections and subtleties,‘Bernardican’ because Bernard of Pavia [d.1213], a noted glossator, came up with this and many like glosses on the law; see below n.184. ⁴⁰ and asinine enough indeed in their fear lest an ass drink the sacrament; for neither in the water before the speaking of the words, nor in the speaking of them, nor in the last instant, nor in brief is the sacrament ever, without words or with, in the water; but the washing is in the water, and no ass can come along to drink that.

73. Neither is the simultaneity of the last instant in speaking the words and of the washing [n.65] necessary, for when the Apostles baptized 3,000 men in one day, Acts 2.41, they did not sprinkle [the water] always with the last syllable of the form such that the water then touched the one baptized.

74. Also, as to what the glossator himself adduces [n.67], that some virtue is in the last instant in the water and at the same time ceases to be, it is nothing if one understands the words properly; because when a permanent thing ceases to be it is not; and when it begins to be it is, for it has the first moment of its being and not the last; therefore if it begins and ceases at the same time, it is and is not at the same time.

75. Nor is it necessary that, because of this, virtue remain in the water after the act of baptizing [n.74], because neither is there any virtue in the water when the baptizer is actually using it, as was touched on in d.1 n.323.

76. Nor do the legal concordances [nn.69-71] prove that the same thing begins and ceases simultaneously; but they get their meaning in the way a lord begins to have lordship over a slave (who has been given to his wife) in a way other than he had lordship before, and ceases to have it in the way he had it before; for he had the slave before immediately and now he has him mediately, because now he is the slave of his wife [n.70].

C. Scotus’ own Opinion

77. I say therefore that the sort of simultaneity required is the sort that is required in human acts; for Christ refused to bind us to so subtle a simultaneity that scarcely could a man perceive or keep it.

78. Now simultaneity between a man’s deed and his word is when one of them begins before the other has totally finished, and this indifferently, whether the one will have finished before the other or the reverse. For example: if someone say this sentence ‘do this’ and he stroke his beard at the same time, whether he begin his act [of stroking] before the speaking of the words or vice versa (provided however that one of them not be finished before the beginning of the other), it will be said ‘he said this and did this at the same time’.

79. Thus I say that whether the priest immerse first with one immersion (where it belongs to the custom of the country to immerse more than once), and afterwards with a second immersion begin the words, or whether he begin the words and at the saying ‘I baptize you’ he immerse along with the words that follow, the simultaneity is sufficient -provided, in brief, the speaking not finish before the beginning of the washing, nor the washing finish before the beginning of the speaking.

II. To the Initial Arguments

80. As to the argument, about the Eucharist [n.62]: there is not the sort of unity between the species of bread and of wine as there is in the sacrament of baptism; for the species are not parts of the sort that neither of them signifies without the other; for the species of bread truly contains the body of Christ before the consecration of the blood. But the words here [in baptism] are not anything of baptism without the washing, nor conversely.

Question Three. Whether the Unity of Baptism Requires the Baptizer to be Distinct in Person from the Baptized

81. To the third [n.25] proceeding thus: that the baptizer does not need to be distinguished in person from the baptized:

Because the priest can give himself the Eucharist (it is plain in the mass); therefore, just as he can receive that sacrament from himself, so this sacrament too.

82. To the contrary:

Decretals III tit.42 ch.4, Gregory IX, “Just as, therefore, in carnal generation he who generates carnally is one and he who is carnally generated is another, so too in sacramental generation, whereby offspring are reborn from water and the Holy Spirit, he who spiritually generates should be one and he who is spiritually generated should be another.” “Certainly, when the body exteriorly or the heart interiorly is baptized, it is necessary that on both sides a paternity and a filiation are able to be found, whereby baptizer and baptized may be referred to each other.”

I. To the Question

83. This question is expressly solved in Decretals [n.82] for the affirmative side.

84. For this is adduced a figure there and an authority and a fitting reason.

A figure because “to designate it Christ himself wished to be baptized, not by himself, but by John the Baptist” [Matthew 3.13.-17].

85. The authority is gathered from the words of the Lord saying to the Apostles: “Go, baptize all peoples in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit” [Matthew 28.19], where he expresses the disciples in one person and the baptized in another.

86. The reason is because it is insinuated there that in baptism a certain spiritual kinship is contracted between generating and generated, “about which the Truth says, “You must be born again” [John 3.7].

87. “Just as then in carnal generation, he who generates carnally is one and he who is carnally generated is another, so too in sacramental generation.. .he who spiritually generates should be one and he who is spiritually generated should be another” [n.82].

II. To the Initial Argument

88. To the argument [n.81] I say that receiving the Eucharist is not a sacrament, but is sacramental eating or perceiving; but baptism itself is a sacrament.

89. And if you argue that at least the priest administers the sacrament of the Eucharist to himself, therefore by parity of reasoning he can administer also the other [baptism to himself] - I reply: to administer the former sacrament is not a sacrament because that former sacrament does not consist in the using; but ‘the sacrament of baptism being administered’ is the sacrament of baptism. And the reason for the diversity is that the sacrament of baptism consists essentially in the using and not in the water (as was said in the preceding question [n.72]); but the Eucharist is something permanent, distinct from the using of the sacrament. So, although someone could be minister in the using of a permanent sacrament and minister of him who receives that use, yet this cannot be in a sacrament that essentially consists in the using.This difference between baptism and the Eucharist is real enough, but one might wonder why it entails that one cannot administer baptism to oneself, for one can certainly wash oneself and speak words at the same time. Perhaps the answer is that Scotus does not intend this difference to show that it is altogether impossible to administer baptism to oneself, but rather to show why Christ could reasonably choose not to allow self-baptism but could reasonably choose to allow self-giving of the Eucharist. For the real reason self-baptizing is ruled out is Christ’s decision to rule it out, but this decision is well grounded in the reasons given in nn.84-87. Likewise, Christ could have decided to rule out self-giving of the Eucharist, but the difference of it from baptism as explained in nn.88-89 gave him good reason not to do so. ⁴¹ Hereby is plain the answer to the argument, because the case is not alike.